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plates) a finer tuning of interpretations and concepts that have been elaborated largely by reference to other empirical objects.2
The success of the leagues challenges current theoretical approaches to collective action. The leagues could not rely on large organizational resources, especially in comparison with established political parties. Similarly, most of their activists had no significant political experience. Also, although opinion-makers have often attributed the success of the leagues to their leaders' communication skills, those leaders had no direct control of mass media and hardly any familiarity with advertising technologies. Finally, success came in spite of a political context that, according to current paradigms, could not be viewed as particularly favorable. These inconsistencies prompt analysts to reconsider the relationship between organizational resources, symbolic production, and political opportunities in collective action theory. I integrate these different layers of analysis by addressing the following question: Under which structural (particularly, political) conditions will some mobilizing messages by "challengers" (Tilly 1978 ) be more effective than others?3 First, I propose a typology of opportunity structures based on a reformulation of Sidney Tarrow's (1994) definition. I relate each type to a specific dominant representation of the political environment, which, following Snow and Benford (1988) , I call the "master frame." I argue that one can expect mobilization messages to be more or less successful in different political settings, depending on their congruence with the master frames dominant in a given political phase. As an example, I illustrate how the leagues' "regional populism" has managed to represent within a single frame certain processes and social changes that in principle also could have been represented in other, sometimes very different, ways. Why regional populism has succeeded where other competing frames have failed is explained by the congruence between the leagues' message and the master frame that characterized the political opportunity structure of the early 1990s in Italy. Next, I show how different degrees of consistency between the opportunity structure and actors' frames can render organizational resources more or less valuable and effective, and how in particular this situation created greater opportunities for the leagues than for their competitors. Finally, I provide some examples showing how this framework contributes to the comparison of mobilization dynamics across time.
Throughout this paper I draw on the substantial secondary evidence that has been gathered to date about the Northern League. This includes survey data about voters (Mannheimer et al. 1991; Corbetta 1993; Cartocci 1994 ; Mannheimer and Sani 1994), activists (Segatti 1992 ), or both (Diamanti 1992 (Diamanti , 1993 ; content analyses of political documents (Allievi 1992) ; electoral posters (Todesco 1992) ; excerpts from journalistic surveys (Pajetta 1994) ; and accounts by leaders (Bossi and Vimercati 1992).
ACCOUNTING FOR CHALLENGERS' SUCCESSES: RELATING FRAMES TO POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES
To date, the determinants of successful collective action have followed two major lines of investigation. One has highlighted, albeit in different ways, the role of challengers in converting grievances and issues into actual mobilization. Resource mobilization theorists (Zald and McCarthy 1987; Gamson 1990 ) have treated the success of social movement organizations mainly as the product of skillful political entrepreneurs acting on the basis of a rationality paradigm. From the second perspective, advocates of constructionist approaches to collective action have identified the sources of successful mobilization in the actors' capacities to mount "symbolic challenges" to dominant definitions of reality by reshaping available symbols and creating new systems of meaning (Melucci 1989 ; Eyerman and Jamison 1991; 2 This is true in spite of the recent rise of interest in conservative and right-wing politics among students of collective action (Oliver and Furman 1989; Lo 1990; Oberschall 1993, chap. 13) .
3 I refer to challengers, rather than to movements, to emphasize that social movements should not be equated with organizations (Tilly 1978; Diani 1992 ). In practice, however, most of the theoretical contributions I discuss here have taken social movements, and particularly organizations acting within those movements, as their empirical object. Although several theoretical disagreements separate resource mobilization from constructionist approaches, these approaches share a critique of structural determinism and an emphasis on the challengers' creative role.4 In contrast, recent structural approaches have explained successful mobilization in the light of processes that are largely beyond actors' direct control. Some observers have pointed out how mobilization is affected by variables such as differential access to status and power, structural changes in the labor force, and urban renewal (Feagin and Capek 1991; Piven and Cloward 1992). Others have related the spread of collective action and protest to the possibilities created by the political system. In this connection, the notion of "political opportunity structure" has gained increasing popularity (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978 ). This notion has been defined in terms of those "dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure" (Tarrow 1994:85) . According to Tarrow, these dimensions are the stability of political alignments, the formal channels of access to the political system, the availability of allies within the polity, and intraelite conflict.
Recently, many scholars have related symbolic production to political conditions more explicitly. Snow and Benford (1992) have focused on the link between framing activity and protest cycles, arguing that success will be easier for those movements whose frames are most consistent with the "master frame" that shapes the whole protest cycle. Gamson and Meyer (1996) have shown that the political opportunity structure itself is the outcome of negotiations about meaning between different actors, often within the same movement or even the same movement organization. Taking a different point of departure, Tarrow (1994) explicitly has incorporated the role of symbolic production into his theory of the political opportunity structure. Although the latter, in the last analysis, remains the key explanatory variable in his model, challengers, by careful use of rhetorical devices, may take advantage of changes in the political context to increase their opportunities to act.5
These contributions have substantially improved our understanding of mobilization dynamics, but they also have left some questions unresolved. Resource mobilization approaches have been criticized for failing to identify the structural inequalities underlying differential access to mobilization resources (Piven and Cloward 1992); cultural approaches have been faulted for failing to connect systematically symbolic production with political and economic structures (Bartholomew and Mayer 1992). Most important, from my point of view, critics have emphasized the risks of indeterminacy (and, I would add, ad hoc explanations) inherent in these perspectives. Given the multiplicity of mobilization resources and cultural symbols that characterize societies at any one time, it would not be difficult for any successful challenger to identify the specific "discourse" with which its frame is aligned or the specific resource that its leaders have managed to mobilize.
Similar remarks apply to analysts of political opportunities. Generally these analysts produce lists of political variables that might be expected to affect protesters' behaviors 4 Substantial divergences especially occur between those who view symbols mainly as a "tool" for political action (McCarthy 1987) and those who see struggles over symbolic production as the major conflictual issue in postindustrial society (Melucci 1989; Benford and Hunt 1992) . Differences between the two fields are not always so sharp, however. Even leading proponents of the frame approach to collective action tend in their research to conceive of frames largely as symbolic resources to be used along with more material resources as a means of increasing challengers' mobilization capacities (Snow et al. 1986; Gamson 1990 Gamson , 1992 The question, then, is how to account systematically for the several potential configurations of the opportunity structure while expanding on current attempts to integrate different theoretical perspectives. I start with a reformulation of the concept of political opportunity structure that draws on two distinct dimensions. One dimension corresponds to Tarrow's "stability of political alignments" and measures the opportunities created by the crisis of dominant cleavages. The other dimension is defined as opportunities for autonomous action within the polity. By the latter term I mean the political conditions that foster among challengers the perception that they may engage in independent action within the political system. Opportunities will be greater in this respect, the more conspicuous the presence of one or more of the other dimensions identified by Tarrow (1994:85-9): increasing access, influential allies, divided elites. The combination of these two variables defines four different configurations of opportunity structures (see Figure 1) . Each reflects a different perception of the political environment and can be expected to be most conducive to a particular type of framing strategy.
A favorable context for challengers is provided, in principle, by an opportunity structure that combines the perception of ample opportunities for independent action with the decreasing capacity of traditional alignments to support collective identities and to structure political action. Here in particular we find the best conditions for the success of what I would call realignment frames. Such conditions emphasize the need to restructure political systems on the basis of new collective identities without a global delegitimation of the established members and procedures of the polity. This environment probably has been the most favorable for the success of the new social movements, at least those (the large majority, I suggest) which have adopted a "democratic populist" perspective (Kitschelt 1993) .
In another configuration of the opportunity structure, high opportunities for autonomous action combine with low opportunities created by the stability of political cleavages. In this case we shall expect inclusion frames to 6 At the same time, however, scholars who take this line are well aware of the problem. Tarrow observes that the dimensions of the opportunity structure "are arrayed differentially in various systems and change over time, often independently of one another, but sometimes in close connection" (1994:89). be those whose mobilization efforts are most likely to succeed. By this expression I mean rhetorical devices emphasizing new political actors' aspirations to be recognized as legitimate members of a polity, in which definitions of the major actors are not altered. Political innovation following the inclusion of new actors thus affects the composition of the political system rather than its symbolic structure. One should expect greater chances to be offered to challengers who emphasize their continuity with established political actors as much as the differences, rather than to challengers who are willing to introduce new, different cleavages in the polity.
In the most difficult situation for the emergence of new political actors, the capacity of traditional alignments to structure political conflicts is not contested and few chances are available for newcomers to play an autonomous political role. In such a context, revitalization frames are likely to be the most successful-or the least unsuccessful. This expression reflects the fact that the most reasonable option open to challengers is that of entering established political organizations in order to redirect their goals and revitalize their structures from within.
Yet, another configuration best fits the Italian politics of the 1990s and the emergence of the League. It is characterized both by global crises of traditional alignments and by poor opportunities for autonomous action by challengers. This configuration can be regarded as particularly favorable for what I call antisystem frames. The mobilizing messages that fall under this heading challenge both fundamental traits of a political system: its dominant cleavages and identities, and its capacity to accommodate heterogeneous and often conflicting interests and orientations within the political process. Antisystem frames therefore advocate a radical transformation of the polity. One should not associate their dominance with the greatest likelihood of confrontational events, political violence, or even revolutionary outcomes. Whether or not representations emphasizing the need for radical change ultimately result in disruption, revolution, or reform (however deep) depends largely on intervening variables, particularly, the mediating role of political elites (Tarrow 1989a (Tarrow , 1994 Tilly 1993) . By antisystem frame I simply mean here any representation of political reality that defines political actors along lines other than established cleavages and denies legitimacy to the routinized functioning of the political process.7
The case of the Northern League provides an empirical illustration of this argument. Before we look at this example in greater detail, however, some qualifications are necessary.
First, the political opportunity structure here depends less on objective facts than on actors' perceptions that chances for successful action are opening up (Gamson and Meyer 1996) . Admittedly, the properties of specific events may be expected to affect actors' interpretations of the available opportunities (McAdam 1994). Nevertheless, the easier it is to associate specific events with broader cultural frames, the greater will be the impact of those events.
Second, elites' policy responsiveness is excluded from the determination of the opportunity structure. Potential members of protest groups are always largely unhappy with the performance of political elites. Ultimately, agency always presupposes feelings of injustice (Gamson 1992 ). Also, full policy responsiveness may be as conducive to demobilization as is fierce repression (Tilly 1978; Rtdig 1990 ). What matters is whether the behavior of elites creates chances to develop effective collective action, not whether those elites are effective problem solvers.
Third, I posit the existence of a dominant perception of the political context (i.e., a "master frame"), for each political phase. This is not a return to the untenable assumption that each country shares a single political culture. Nor should one forget that controversies about interpretations of the political context arise regularly even among and within movement organizations (Gamson and Meyer 1996) . I borrow Snow and Benford's (1992) idea of the "master frame" to stress the importance of representations of reality, which in a given phase are perceived as more compelling and "realistic" than Fourth, I view frames here as abstract forms of political rhetoric rather than as belief systems anchored to specific contents. For example, the success of the League's populism is related to its consistency with a broader, strongly critical perception of the political opportunity structure rather than to the peculiar themes and symbols of populism as such.9
Fifth, and most important, the notion of frame alignment is redefined here. 14 Use of the past tense throughout this section does not imply that this picture of the League's discourse is totally, or even partially, outdated. Rather, I wish to stress that I focus on the period that preceded the League's access to-and later, withdrawal from-government.
nating from people's work. Traditional political elites were described as having lost all touch with ordinary people and were contrasted with the League's leaders, who had proved capable of perceiving and giving voice to their people's beliefs and aspirations (see, for example, Gianfranco Miglio's foreword to Bossi and Vimercati 1992).
Rather than taking an autonomous form, antisouthern sentiments were framed largely within the antipolitician perspective:15
We aim at the transformation of the current, centralized state, that is in the hands of the Southern ethnic majority, whose dominant position is enforced by "Roman" parties. (Lombardia Autonomista, January 1986, as quoted in Allievi 1992:38; see also Leonardi and Kowacs 1993) Anti-elite sentiments also resulted in the strongest disregard for intellectuals and journalists, usually described as the servants of rulers. Sometimes these sentiments even took the form of overt hostility toward the Catholic hierarchy (Pajetta 1994) .
The second basic theme of regional populism consisted of suspicion and hostility toward marginal social groups. One major polemical target was the ethnic underclass from Third-World countries. To be fair, the leagues never adopted a strictly racist approach, nor did their electoral success increase overt acts of intolerance. In a few cases, such as in Varese, some positive steps even were taken to facilitate the integration of non-White immigrants (Pajetta 1994, chap. 3). As a rule, however, the leagues were extremely critical of current immigration policies, which they judged to be too "loose." They viewed immigrants as a problem rather than as an opportunity (in both cultural and economic terms) for Italian society.16 Hostility toward immigrants was often paralleled by similar attitudes toward individuals with unconventional lifestyles. This was not restricted to drug addicts or other marginal groups, but also applied to people who violated conventional social norms regarding sexual behavior, "regular" work, or "normal" family life; for example, a member of a local branch of the Northern League in the Northeast was expelled from the party because of his homosexuality.
The third major theme in the League's populism was a generally suspicious attitude toward political activity. It went well beyond the stigmatization of specific politicians' illegal behaviors. Rather, it entailed a wholesale rejection of the mediating role of political parties: (Todesco 1992 ). In four-fifths of these posters, emphasis was placed exclusively on external enemies rather than on positive goals or proactive policies. The most frequently cited targets of hostility were "political parties" (mentioned in 16 posters), the "mafia" (15), and "thieves and corrupted people" (i.e., politicians and civil servants) (12). "Rome" (taken as the symbol of centralized, inefficient power), "the state," and "southern Italy" also were mentioned with some frequency (9, 9, and 6 times respectively). In agreement with other findings about the League's monthly magazine, southern Italy was not treated as an adversarial target in itself, but as part of a broader message (Segatti 1992 ). In the League's electoral posters, the Mafia and the south occurred together only twice, while the mafia was associated with politicians, the state, and political parties 14 times (Todesco 1992 :284-90).
THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES OF REGIONAL POPULISM
One might suggest that the League's populism is a reasonable explanation of its success. After all, it allowed it to incorporate into a single discourse a hatred of political parties and state bureaucracies, suspicion of deviants and Third-World immigrants, and resentment of privileges granted to economic elites. Therefore it could be regarded as an example of successful "frame alignment." This conclusion, however, would prevent us from understanding why the League's mobilizing messages succeeded where competing frames failed. For this purpose we need a more systematic treatment of the connection between the League's frame and the political opportunity structure.
How well do the various dimensions of the political opportunity structure fit the case of the Northern League? Traditional alignments certainly were crumbling in Italy in the early 1990s. According to Eurobarometer surveys, the proportion of those refusing any (even weak) identification with the left-right cleavage had risen from 12 percent in 1977 to 27 percent in 1992 (Martinotti and Stefanizzi 1994). This situation facilitated the spread of alternative points of view, which stressed the emergence of a new cleavage based on territorial differences within the country. It also created opportunities for groups supporting promarket and antiwelfare views.
In this respect, one should note the peculiarities of the Italian left-right cleavage as it emerged after World War II. In contrast to other Western countries, the major rightwing political party in Italy was not a committed advocate of free-market and deregulation policies. Both the left and the Christian Democrats recognized the importance of welfare policies to counterbalance the social costs of market competition. At least in the political rhetoric, emphasis was placed on collective rather than individual responsibility. The ideological differences lay in the definition of the criteria by which citizenship rights should be allocated or in the role assigned to traditional institutions (such as the family or the Catholic Church) in addition to state welfare agencies in the provision of welfare benefits (Ascoli 1985; Zincone 1992 ). The relationship between the crisis of dominant alignments and the spread of populism is consistent with the broader arguments that associate the former with the success of challengers of any kind. In other aspects of the political opportunity structure, however, this connection is hardly present. To begin with, the regional leagues could not rely on support from, or alliances with, any established member of the polity; they faced fierce opposition from all traditional political actors across the left-right spectrum. Moreover, the regional leagues developed in a context where patterned inter-and intra-elite conflicts were hard to detect and understand in political terms. Although a number of conflicts shook Italian elites during the 1980s, their implications were not easily grasped by ordinary people. Therefore, their impact on citizens' broad perceptions of the political context was quite small, and they did not create new opportunities for challengers attempting to gain political recognition.20 In addition, the regional leagues achieved an impressive degree of success in a political system where institutional channels granted little access to the polity to nonrepresented or poorly represented interests. On the one hand, there were-and still are-few opportunities for interest groups in terms of access to litigation procedures or involvement in consultation forums, hearings, and the like (Diani 1995, chap. 2). On the other hand, until 1993 it was quite easy for challengers to obtain parliamentary or local council seats, thanks to the proportional electoral system.21 Even so, the general hostility of the established parties toward the Northern League denied the League any capacity for coalition (Sartori 1976) . Its chances for autonomous action within the polity were therefore reduced, even from the viewpoint of electoral participation.
Finally, available options for representing interests also depended largely on the new challengers' connections within the system, and on their leaders' political skills. The lack of significant political experience among many League activists and sympathizers, which emerges from preliminary accounts (Diamanti 1992 20 This point applies, for instance, to the struggles in the late 1980s, in which Silvio Berlusconi's and Carlo De Benedetti's groups fought for control of Mondadori, the most important publisher in the country. Although these struggles had important political implications, the general public could hardly grasp their political relevance (Giglioli and Mazzoleni 1992) . 21 The new majoritarian electoral system was not put into effect until summer 1993.
1985 and 1992, the proportion who felt that "all parties are the same" increased from 25 percent to 50 percent, while the proportion who felt that political parties were essential for democracy declined from 74 percent to 42 percent (Mannheimer and Sani 1994:8-9). Admittedly, massive mistrust of political elites has been a constant trait of Italian society (Cartocci 1994 ). Yet the reduction in the early 1990s in the proportion who expressed loyalty to at least one party demonstrates the increasing deficit in representation. No political actor was thought any longer to be reliable, even as a patron of private interests. Moreover, those who rejected left-right differences were also the most strongly disillusioned with political actors in general (Martinotti and Stefanizzi 1994) . Most significantly, a strong correlation has been found between electoral support for the League, mistrust of traditional politicians, and refusal to identify with the leftright scheme (Mannheimer and Sani 1994, chap. 4).
If we had treated these dimensions as individual predictors of successful action, our interpretation of the League's success would have been rather weak. The League's expansion should have been prevented, not supported, by the lack of potential reliable allies within the polity, by the absence of patterned conflicts between elites and by the limited number of institutional opportunities for interest representation offered by the polity. We can explain why this was not the case only if we accept that different types of opportunity structures exist, and that the League's populism was aligned with the general perception of politics dominant among significant sectors of Italian public opinion in that period. The League's emphasis on regional differences was wholly consistent with the decreasing salience of traditional political identities, which presupposed in contrast the existence of class or religious cleavages within the Italian population. Similarly, the League's disregard for political elites and institutions matched citizens' perceptions of the political system as a generally closed and hostile milieu, which offered no opportunities for action from within. The League's mobilization message, in other words, was consistent with a widespread antisystem master frame.
COMPETITION BETWEEN CHALLENGERS: ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES AND NARRATIVE FIDELITY
Regional populists, however, were not the only challengers to emerge in that context. Between 1990 and 1993, strong criticism of the old system was also expressed by small parties such as the Greens (who ran in national elections for the first time in 1987) or La Rete (who first ran in 1990). These organizations also were involved in broader coalitions of old and new parties, movement organizations, and public interest groups, which in the 1993 local elections ran under the slogan "reforming politics."
Both the Greens and La Rete shared with the League a peripheral position in the parliamentary arena. Like the League, they had been very active in fighting public corruption and promoting mobilizations against the spread of criminal groups across the country. In principle they were credible alternatives to the League. In many respects their messages also were rather similar: They, too, advocated the replacement of the old political class with new representatives, and believed in overcoming the traditional barriers between left and right. Ultimately, however, they profited far less than the League from the crisis of traditional parties. In the crucial 1992 national elections, La Rete polled 1.9 percent and the Greens polled 2.8 percent, both well below the 8.6 percent polled by the League even though they were not restricted like the League to the northern regions (Istat 1993a) .
One of the causes of their failure was the lack of consistency between their messages and antisystem frames. First of all, although the goals and frames of both the Greens and La Rete were difficult to place on a traditional left-right continuum, the majority of their most prominent figures had a background of militancy in left-wing parties or movements. As a result, these leaders were not perceived as reliable sources, or "validators" (Oberschall 1993 ), of messages advocating the overcoming of the left-right cleavage. This situation was not helped by their frequent association, in local elections and other political events, with traditional left-wing parties such as the PDS (Biorcio 1994). Moreover, regardless of their specific alliances, neither the Greens nor La Rete were prepared to take stances as fully antipolitical as those of the League. Although they were strongly critical of the old parties, their leaders continued to emphasize the specificity of political activity and to accord it a degree of dignity. They also tended to differentiate between the responsibilities of ruling parties (especially the Christian Democrats and Socialists) and oppositional parties (especially the former Communists).
In contrast, as we have seen, the League attacked the political system as a whole. It also strongly criticized notions of political activity as patient mediation between diverging interests, and was scarcely interested in developing internal democratic procedures. Coupled with its activists' lack of involvement in the traditional political class (Diamanti 1992), these attitudes gave its frames stronger "narrative fidelity" (Snow and Benford 1988) than its competitors' in the eyes of prospective constituents with explicit antipolitical sentiments.22
In contrast, it is doubtful whether organizational resources mattered in this respect. Admittedly we lack conclusive evidence about the League's real strength. In November 1991, for example, Mr. Bossi claimed about 135,000 members and 300 local branches; in the following May, however, the party's newsletter, mailed to all members, reported only 50,000 copies and 132 branches (Todesco 1992:158-62) . Even if the higher figure were the correct one-which I doubtit would not suggest an organizational structure that was overwhelmingly stronger than that of the League's competitors, especially in light of the small mobilizing capacity demonstrated by most local chapters (Todesco 1992 (Todesco 1992 ). The spread of its messages was not due to an efficient staff or a generous budget, but rather to "free media exposure" (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988:60). As a radically novel phenomenon, the League received increasing media attention, especially TV coverage.24 This treatment often reflected negative evaluations of the new party. Especially in the case of public TV, however, the sources of those judgments were either full-time politicians or media professionals usually perceived as close to traditional parties. Rather than undermining public perception of the League as a credible challenger, this negative coverage reinforced it. Moreover, media of all political perspectives gave increasing attention to the very issues on which the League was focusing, thus, once again, facilitating consistency between their priorities and the overall public agenda.25
Resources mattered, however, in the 1994 elections, when the League faced electoral competition from the newly created party, Forza Italia.26 In contrast to the leaders of La Rete or the Greens, Mr. Berlusconi was one of Italy's best known entrepreneurs and the 22 For discussions of recent developments in Italian politics see Diamanti and Mannheimer (1994) , Ginsborg (1994) , and Mannheimer and Sani (1994) . 23 Also, according to surveys conducted in 1992 in Lombardy, overall membership in political parties in the region exceeded 500,000, while environmental organizations had 150,000 members (Biorcio and Diani 1993). 24 The same did not happen to the Greens or La Rete, possibly because they were closer to traditional political styles in spite of the new issues they raised.
25 Analysis of the most influential "centre-left" daily paper in the country, la Repubblica, has shown for instance that editorials addressing issues of political corruption, inefficiencies in the public administration and the political system, the waste of public resources, large regional differences, and immigration-related problems in- Thus, although resources are important for mobilizing consensus, they do not guarantee success (Tarrow 1994:150) . Their ultimate effect varies according to the congruence between the challengers' specific frames and the opportunity structure. This congruence converts potential assets into effective assets (Moaddel 1992) . Specifically, the effectiveness of organizational resources is increased substantially if the actors' strategies are framed so as to be consistent with the master frames, and if they characterize the opportunity structure at a given time.
CONCLUSIONS
I have focused on mobilization attempts conducted in a single period. The framework presented here may help to clarify why, in a given political period, some frames are less effective than others, although they appear just as plausible at first glance. At the same time, it enables us to capture the differences between opportunity structures at different lutionary overthrowing of the "bourgeois state" (Lumley 1990 ).
This was not the reaction, however, to a generally closed attitude of the political establishment toward new demands. Careful analysis of the protest wave has shown that the rise of autonomous mobilizations was encouraged by changes and innovations among traditional political actors (Tarrow 1989a ). Significant sectors of the elite were willing to engage in dialogues with challenging groups; they also mobilized against attempts to increase the costs of participation by means of police repression, as became clear in the aftermath of the 1969 bombings in Milan.
Moreover, despite efforts to drastically reframe the traditional left-right opposition, and to place a new emphasis on the leading role of the working class and on social actors' autonomy in relation to old left organizations (Tarrow 1989b) , the centrality of the left-right cleavage was never questioned. In that period the issue was the rule of the Christian Democrats and their allies rather than the cleavage as such. Indeed, as the cycle progressed, reform-oriented policies began to be implemented. Traditional leftwing parties and unions strengthened their links with the oppositional movements and ultimately regained their leadership over these movements (Tarrow 1989a ).
This approach explains why the bearers of antisystem frames-namely the most radical new left parties and movement organizations-largely failed to establish themselves as powerful political actors in the mid-1970s, despite the favorable electoral system and the impressive amount of unconventional protest activities occurring at that time. Most of their potential constituents continued to identify with traditional alignments; they still believed that traditional left-wing organizations had a positive role in the representation process. The new left leaders often adopted frames that portrayed the old left organizations as betrayers of the working class and advocated their replacement by the new left groups (Bobbio 1990 ). This may have provided their core activists with strong symbolic incentives, but it -ran counter to the dominant views among their prospective supporters and thus rendered frame alignment more problematic. The years preceding 1968 were different again, in that the political system was shaped by Communist-Socialist and Catholic identities and was reluctant to offer challengers opportunities for autonomous action. In such a context, "revitalization" frames proved the most appropriate option. For example, new ideas started to spread within the Catholic Church well before the 1968 protest cycle began (Tarrow 1989a ). However, obstacles to explicit contestation of the Church hierarchies encouraged concealment of attempts to innovate. At first, support for new ideas was not expressed in openly critical terms; support took the form of arguments that suggested new and different interpretations of doctrinal principles while it formally reconfirmed loyalty to these principles. Opportunities for independent, explicit action were perceived by those favoring a more socially concerned Church only later, when ideas originating from the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council became more diffuse and a fragmentation of the hierarchy began. At that point the number of independent religious communities increased, and even explicitly left-wing Catholic political organizations such as Cristiani per il Socialismo (Christians for Socialism) were created (Cuminetti 1983 ). Revitalization frames remind us that collective action often originates within institutions rather than outside and against them (Tarrow 1994) .
One additional advantage of this framework, therefore, is its capacity to identify the differences between political phases, particularly those phases which were characterized by similar attitudes toward politics and the political class. As these examples suggest, harsh criticism of the establishment and of government policies was found in Italy both in the period 1968 to 1973 and in the early 1990s, but the two periods differed both in the opportunities perceived by challengers and in the impact of different mobilizing frames. Similarly, both the early 1960s and the 1980s were characterized in broad terms by a decrease of interest in politics and a greater political consensus. Once again, however, differences in the salience of traditional identities and perceptions of opportunities for autonomous action created chances for somewhat different types of frames. Swidler (1986) has remarked that ". . . in unsettled cultural periods, explicit ideologies directly govern action, but structural opportunities for action determine which among competing ideologies survive in the long run" (p. 273). The framework described here offers us a clearer way of specifying those opportunities. It also reminds us, however, that challengers' mobilizing messages may be effective in any political structure, albeit in different guises, and that their impact need not be restricted to the effervescent, unsettled periods on which most analysts of collective action usually focus. 
